University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1981

In Memoriam: Malcolm P. Sharp
Gerhard Casper

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerhard Casper, "In Memoriam: Malcolm P. Sharp ", 48 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (1981).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

The
n
University
of Chicago
Law Review

VOLUME 48 NUMBER 1

WINTER 1981

In Memoriam: Malcolm P. Sharp*
Gerhard Caspert
This service for which we have assembled in memory of Malcolm Sharp is, in one way, quite illegitimate. In a 1965 letter to
Dean Neal, Malcolm said that he did not want a memorial service.
His reason-and Malcolm always gave a reason-was somewhat
shocking, at least for those who, when they think about occasions
like this, are mostly bewildered by emotions of sadness, love, and
bereavement. Malcolm wrote: "In a long life I've seen only one that
was useful, and that depended on special circumstances." If one is
not an anthropologist, it is difficult even to approach the question
of how to make a memorial service "useful."
'Should I urge you to disband? Of course not. One of my favorite stories about Malcolm is one that Wilber Katz told in the issue
of The University of Chicago Law Review dedicated to Malcolm
upon his retirement from the Law School. I quote Dean Katz:
Most rewarding of all my associations with Malcolm were the
sometimes dizzying explorations of ideas which accompanied
our exploration of mountain trails. I learned on one occasion
the secret of his capacity to follow trails of both kinds. We
* Remarks delivered at the memorial service for Malcolm P. Sharp at Rosary College
on October 5, 1980.
t William B. Graham Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, The University of
Chicago.
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had carefully mapped out an unfamiliar hike and had followed our plan perhaps less carefully as we discussed equitable liens-or was it Admiral Mahan or the mystery of responsible freedom? In the afternoon we were surprised to find
ourselves in the same spot where we had been an hour or two
earlier. I was somewhat dismayed, but Malcolm strode ahead
explaining, "It's always good to keep a flexible sense of
objective."'
Malcolm's family was right to keep a flexible sense of objective. It is really quite unthinkable not to gather in memory of this
most beloved and admired man who taught at the University of
Chicago Law School for some thirty years, through a post-retirement appointment, then took another post-retirement position at
New Mexico, and finally a post-post-post-retirement assignment at
Rosary College. In short, Malcolm never retired as a teacher. In the
letter to Phil Neal that I mentioned earlier, he referred to himself
as "primarily a teacher, or learner." Indeed he was both, and I am
grateful that our paths crossed, if belatedly.
When we first met, I happened to be teaching the commerce
clause. Malcolm immediately engaged me in a dialogue that led to
my revoking, the next day in class, a theory I had been expounding
and in which I had firmly believed until Malcolm, gently and with
a twinkle in his eye, showed me how and why I was wrong. In
honor of Malcolm I should like to be as "useful" as possible. One
way to be useful, I think, is to ask what Malcolm has taught us
that we should not forget, especially those of us who try to be
teachers ourselves.
I am not qualified to speak about his contributions to the
analysis of contract law, though I have admired the penetrating
casebook that he wrote with his one-time Chicago colleague, Fritz
Kessler.' Nor am I qualified to speak to many of his other interests-legal, economic, political, literary, philosophical, anthropological, and biological. Malcolm's sense of objective was not only
flexible but universal. Permit me instead to single out four aspects
that seem of special importance to me, and useful indeed.
The first of these is obviously the very point I have just adumbrated. Malcolm's education and learning provide an outstanding
example of the qualities that, in Edmund Wilson's words, have
' Katz, A "Vignette" of Malcolm Sharp, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 196, 196 (1966).
2

F.

KESSLER & M. SHARP, CoNmAcTS

(1953).
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made the great American jurists and that, again according to Wilson, Malcolm Sharp combined: "subtle intellect, philosophic and
literary interests, a long view of human history,... and a combination of moral anxieties with an ironic sense of humor."'8 Malcolm
told all of us, I am sure, that the two books that most affected him
were Proust's Remembrance of Things Past and Toynbee's A
Study of History. Especially Proust's skeptical and yet confident
search for and recapture of "time lost" suggest what Malcolm's literary standards were. In the law library of the University of Chicago, the books of "Professor Malcolm Sharp's List of Recommended Readings" constitute the Sharp Collection of general
readings. Let us make sure that future generations of students will
find their way to it and through it.
When speaking with alumni about Malcolm, I often encounter
a well-remembered bemusement about his classes. Sometimes it
seems that only the most respected and admired of teachers evoke
this sense of confusion. It is captured in a student verse of, as
Harry Kalven characterized it, "affectionate malice":
Malcolm, Malcolm, you are welcome
With your ivy covered mind
Though no one can understand you,
You are good and wise and kind.4
The second aspect of Malcolm Sharp the teacher that is useful
to keep in mind is his attitude toward political power. Malcolm's
sympathy with the sufferings of human beings was not something
compartmentalized and unconnected with his view of professional
responsibilities and ethics. Indeed, the bemusement I just spoke of
may have been the result of his utter unwillingness to compartmentalize. Law, literature, and politics were all easily brought together. In an article on constitutional law published at the height
of McCarthyism in The University of Chicago Law Review,
Malcolm cited another of his recommended readings-Kafka's The
Trial-as "the definitive philosophical statement about loyalty
proceedings.""
Just as Marcel Proust had worked on behalf of Captain Dreyfus, Malcolm came to the defense-in the lawyer's sense of the

'
'

Wilson, Conversing with Malcolm Sharp, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 198, 200 (1966).
Kalven, For M.P.S., 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 193, 193 (1966).
Sharp, The Old Constitution, 20 U. CHL L. REv. 529, 545 n.27 (1953).
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word-of unpopular causes, such as in the Rosenberg case." Among
unpopular causes there are some that one may characterize as
more popular than others, at least in the long run. Malcolm's
choices were not necessarily the popular unpopular causes, nor
were they predictable.
Of the manner in which he approached political power, Malcohn gave a summary in an observation about his friend and University of Chicago colleague William Crosskey. In 1973 Malcolm
wrote: "He was, like me, neither a Pelagian nor a Jansenist; but,
like me, he had a healthy Eighteenth Century regard for the limitations of... the human being in power."'7 The paragraph from
which I quote continues, by the way, with a capsule rendering of
Malcolm's views on economic liberty that tends to surprise those
who have embraced the contemporary notion that political liberalism and the welfare state go hand in hand. Malcolm added:
"While history as usual is ambiguous, economic liberty seems to
me, in experience and in principle, a necessary and probably in the
long run a sufficient condition of freedom in communication." 8
The third lesson to learn from Malcolm Sharp is a belief he
shared with Crosskey. Malcolm steadfastly and tirelessly defended
not only much of the substance of Crosskey's work but, more particularly, his method. Crosskey was of the view that "the historical
meaning of the Constitution, read in the context of its presentation
and adoption, must determine its later meaning." 9 The issue is not
whether Crosskey or Malcolm interpreted the Constitution correctly but how they went about this task-for instance, Sharp in
his magisterial essay on the separation of powers that was published in the second volume of The University of Chicago Law
Review. 10
In the current debate over methods of constitutional interpretation, the so-called noninterpretivist school views the Constitution essentially as a system of values (albeit rather vaguely per' Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953). See generally Krash, Malcolm
Sharp and the Rosenberg Case: Remembrance of Things Past, 33 U. CHL L. REv. 202
(1966).
Sharp, Crosskey, Anastaplo, and Meiklejohn on the United States Constitution, 20
U. Cm. L. SCH. REc. 3, 14 (1973).

3 Id.
Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 439, 442 (1954) (review of W. CROSSKFY,
POLICS AND THE CONSITUON IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953)).
10 Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI.

L. Rav. 385 (1935).
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ceived ones) and denies the rationality and feasibility of historical
approaches. There is nothing new about the controversy between
these two types of interpretation, as Malcolm's writings amply
demonstrate. Though he and Crosskey may have been overly confident as to the reach and results of historical interpretation, Malcolm's cogent summary of that position, as offered in his discussion
of his friend's contribution to it, is worth quoting:
[V]erbal honesty, the Anglo-American theory of the function
of the Judiciary, and the nature of a written constitution, require that we give effect to the historical meaning of the Constitution where it can be determined. That meaning should
prevail over doctrines-however statesmanlike-invented by
the courts to justify their own views. Though Mr. Crosskey's
position may have become unfamiliar, it seems to the reviewer
impregnable.1 '
To read Malcolm on Crosskey is one of the more refreshing experiences a constitutional law teacher can have. The issues are complex and not easily reduced to a few words in praise of Malcolm,
but to remember his words on this subject is very useful indeed.
I shall conclude by suggesting a general lesson that can be illustrated by a reference to Malcolm's beloved Proust. It is a lesson
that takes us beyond the confines of the legal profession, and it is
thus, I hope, a fitting conclusion to these words of tribute to a man
with interests and talents as nearly universal as one is likely to
encounter in this age of intellectual specialization. Swan, the
main character in the first volume of Remembrance of Things
Past, when looking at old portraits always recognized in their features some trait shared by his own friends and acquaintances. Malcolm possessed a similar gift of attributing immediacy and vitality
to all of the multifarious objects of his contemplation. Let us try to
imitate Malcolm in this. To the extent that we succeed, we shall
profit both as teachers and as lifelong learners.

" Sharp, supra note 9, at 443.
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